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Abstract
This note gives sufficient conditions of cross risk vulnerability introduced
by Malevergne and Rey (2005), which is the equivalent condition to guarantee
that an unfair non–monetary background risk makes decision makers more risk
averse. The sufficient conditions determined by this note expand the results
for univariate utility function into bivariate utility functions.
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1 Introduction
In recent two decades, a considerable number of studies has been focused on the
effects of background risks on optimal decisions under uncertainty. Since changes
in risk aversion have unambiguous comparative statics predections in most models
with uncertainty, many authors derived conditions to guarantee that background
risks make decision mekers more risk averse. A landmark concerning this topic
is the “risk vulnerability” introduced by Gollier and Pratt (1996), which is the
weakest condition among them. As the risk vulnerability is a technical condition,
several authors determined sufficient conditions of risk vulenrability which have
some intuitive interpretations. The following two conditions are well known: (i) the
standard risk aversion derived by Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992), (ii) the decreasing
and convex risk aversion derived by Gollier and Pratt (1996). An excellent survey
on this topic can be found in Part IV in Gollier (2001), the interestend readers can
see it.
Most studies concerning background risks in optimal choices under uncertainty,
consider decision makers with univariate von–Neumann Morgenstern utility func-
tions. However, there are many situations in which decision makers have multi–
dimensional utility functions. For exapmle, utilities of decision makers are not only
depend on finacial wealth, but also health status in the context of health economics.
We can list many examples of decision making with multi–dimension, like environ-
mental status, social status, and so on. Hence, we need to understand the effects
of background risks on optimal choices with multi–dimension under uncertainty. In
their recent intersting paper, Malevergne and Rey (2005) generalize risk vulnerabil-
ity to the case that decision makers have bivariate utiity functions, and they call it
“cross risk vulenerability”. The purpose of this note gives the sufficient conditions
of cross risk vulnerability, which are correspond to the well–known sufficient condi-
tions of risk vulnerability above mentioned. A best way to understand the effects of
background risks in multi–dimensional decisions under uncertainty is a generaliza-
tion of results in one–dimensional as possible as we can, baecause we obtain many
understaings regarding them in last two decades. One importance of our results
comes from this point of view.
2 Preliminary Analysis
First of all, we give some preliminary analyses to derive sufficient conditions of
cross risk vulnerability introduced by Malevergne and Rey (2005). Our setting is
identical with them, and therefore we borrow their notaions. Let us consider a
dicision maker (DM) with a bivariate (von Nuemann Morgenstern) utility function
1
U : R × R → R. We impose standard assumptions of the utility functions U : (i)
U1, U2 > 0, (ii)U11, U22 ≤ 0, and (iii) U12 ≤ 0. Here subscripts denote partial and
cross derivatives of corresponding arguments, i.e. Ui denotes the partial derivative of
the i–th argument, and Uij denotes the cross derivative of the i– and j–th arguments.
The assumption (ii) and (iii) mean risk and correlation aversion, respectively. The
notion of correlation aversion was initiated by Epstein and Tanny (1980). In a
recent paper, Eeckhoudt, et al. (2005) characterized some desiable properties of
cross derivatives of bivariate utility functions using preferences over the fifty–fifty
lottery suggested by Eeckhoudt and Schlensinger (2005). As Malevergne and Rey
(2005), the first and second arguments stand for wealth and health, respectively.
We define the cross derived utility function toward health background risk ²˜ as
V (x, y) = E[U(x, y + ²˜)]. (1)
The health background risk ²˜ is a random variable followed by the distribution
function F : [², ²]→ [0, 1]. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the distibution
function F is differentiable, that is the density function f(²) = F ′(²) exists. The
cross derived utility function is a slight modification of derived utility function for
univariate utility functions defined by Kihlstrom, et al. (1981) and Nachman (1982).
The Arrow–Pratt (absolute) risk aversions toward a wealth risk of the utility function
U and V are given as
A(x, y) := −U11(x, y)
U1(x, y)
, and AV (x, y) := −V11(x, y)
V1(x, y)
. (2)
Following Malevergne and Rey (2005), we define the cross risk vulnerability:
Definition 2.1. The utility function U is cross risk vulnerable, if any unfair health
background risks make the DM in a more risk averse manner:
E[²˜] ≤ 0⇒ AV (x, y) ≥ A(x, y), ∀(x, y). (3)
As a slight generalization of the notion introduced by Kimball (1990), we define
two precautionary premiums toward a zero–mean health background risk:
E[U1(x, y + ²˜)] = U1(x, y −ΨH) = U1(x−ΨW , y). (4)
We call ΨH a precautionary premium in health, and ΨW a precautionary premium
in wealth, respectively. It is obvious that both the precoutionary premium ΨH and
ΨW are the functions of x, y, ²˜, and U , but we suppress them in order to simplify
the notation. Using the Arrow–Pratt approximation, we obtain the precautionary
premium in health and wealth as follows:
ΨH ' 1
2
(
−U122(x, y)
U12(x, y)
)
E[²˜2] =
1
2
PH(x, y)E[²˜2], (5)
2
ΨW ' 1
2
(
−U122(x, y)
U11(x, y)
)
E[²˜2] =
1
2
PW (x, y)E[²˜2]. (6)
PH and PW can be interpreted as Kimball (absolute) cross prudence in health
and wealth toward a health risk. As recalling that U12 and U11 is positive, this
(approximation) equality imlies that
ΨH(W ) ≥ (≤) 0⇔ U122(x, y) ≥ (≤) 0. (7)
Eeckhoudt, et al. (2005) justified the nonnegativity of U122, and they call it cross
prudence in wealth.
3 Main Result
In the remainder of the paper, we give three sufficient conditions of cross risk vul-
nerabulity, thier remarks, and proofs.
3.1 Propositions and their Remaks
Proposition 3.1. If the Arrow–Pratt risk averison is decreasing and convex in the
second argument, i.e. A2(x, y) ≤ 0 and A22(x, y) ≥ 0, then a utility function U is
cross risk vulenrable.
Proposition 3.2. If the Arrow–Pratt risk aversion is decreasing in the second ar-
gument, and the Kimball prudence in halth is decreasing in the first argument, i.e.
A2(x, y) ≤ 0 and PH1 (x, y) ≤ 0, then a utility function U is cross risk vulenrable.
Proposition 3.3. If the Arrow–Pratt risk aversion is decreasing in the first and
second argument, and the Kimball prudence in wealth is decreasing in the first
argument, i.e. A1(x, y) ≤ 0, A2(x, y) ≤ 0 and PW1 (x, y) ≤ 0, then a utility function
U is cross risk vulenrable.
Proposition 3.1 was already obtained by Malevaergne and Rey (2005) in a com-
plete different way. They obtained it as a corollary of proposition 1 and 3 in their
paper. In contrast to them, we prove it in a direct way. While they did not give a
comment, Proposition 3.1 is a natural generalization of the result that is a sufficient
condition of risk vulenerablity in the case of univariate utility functions, which is
determined by Gollier and Pratt (1996). Indeed, our proof provides for a different
proof of their result. As our proof is similar to Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) which
derived a sufficient condition of risk vulenerablity in the case of univariate utility
functions, Proposition 3.2 and 3.3 can be viwed as a natural generalization of the
result derived by Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992). This implies that the conditions
of the proposition 3.2 and 3.3 correspond to the standard risk aversion in the case
of bivariate utility functions, which is introduced by Kimball (1993).
3
3.2 Proofs
The proofs of proposition 3.2 and 3.3 are same except for some minor points, hence
we omit the proof of proposition 3.3.
Proof of propsition 3.1: Let us define the following function for ² ∈ [², ²]
fˆ(²) :=
U1(x, y + ²)f(²)∫ ²
²
U1(x, y + ²)f(²)d²
. (8)
Since fˆ(²) is positive for all ² ∈ [², ²] and Fˆ (²) = ∫ ²
²
fˆ(²)d² = 1, Fˆ : [², ²]→ [0, 1] can
be viewed as a distribution function defined over the compact support [², ²]. The
correlation aversion implies that U1(x, y + ²) ≥ U1(x, y + ²′) for all ², ²′ ∈ [², ²] with
² ≤ ²′. Hence, we have that
f(²′)
f(²)
≥ U1(x, y + ²
′)f(²′)
U1(x, y + ²)f(²)
⇔ f(²
′)
f(²)
≥ fˆ(²
′)
fˆ(²)
. (9)
The equation (9) means that F dominates Fˆ in the sense of monotone likelihood
ration dominance. The monotone likelihood ratio dominance is a strong stochastic
dominance of the first–order stochastic dominance. Since the expectation of the
health background risk is non–positive, we have Eˆ[²˜] ≤ E[²˜] ≤ 0. For details of
stochastic dominance, the intersted readers are refereed to e.g. Shaked and Shan-
thikumar (1994) or Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002). Using this distirubtion function, we
have
AV (x, y) =
∫ ²
²
A(x, y + ²)fˆ(²)d² (10)
= Eˆ[A(x, y + ²˜)], (11)
where Eˆ denotes the expectation operator with respect to the distribution function
Fˆ . By the equation (11), we obtain that
AV (x, y) = Eˆ[A(x, y + ²˜)] (12)
≥ A(x, y + Eˆ[²˜]) (13)
≥ A(x, y). (14)
The first inequaltiy follows from the Jensen’s inequality, the second inequaliy follows
from Eˆ[²˜] ≤ 0 and A2 ≤ 0. ¤
Proof of propsition 3.2: The health background risk ²˜ decomposes to ²0 and ²˜1, i.e.
²˜
d
= ²0+ ²˜1, where ²0 = E[²˜] ≤ 0 and E[²˜1] = 0. By the definition of the precautionary
premium in health ΨH , we have that
V1(x, y) = U1(x, y + ²0 −ΨH), (15)
4
V11(x, y) = U11(x, y + ²0 −ΨH)− U12(x, y + ²0 −ΨH)ΨHx , (16)
where ΨHx denotes the partial derivative of Ψ
H with respect to x, i.e. ΨHx = ∂Ψ
H/
∂x. Using the equation (15) and (16), we obtain that
−V11(x, y)
V1(x, y)
= −U11(x, y + ²0 −Ψ
H)− U12(x, y + ²0 −ΨH)ΨHx
U1(x, y + ²0 −ΨH) (17)
= −U11(x, y + ²0 −Ψ
H)
U1(x, y + ²0 −ΨH) +
U12(x, y + ²0 −ΨH)
U1(x, y + ²0 −ΨH) Ψ
H
x (18)
≥ −U11(x, y + ²0 −Ψ
H)
U1(x, y + ²0 −ΨH) (19)
≥ −U11(x, y)
U1(x, y)
= A(x, y). (20)
As U1 > 0, U12 < 0, and P
H
1 ≤ 0 is equivalent to ΨHx ≤ 0, we have that the second
term in the equation (18) is non–negative. Hence, we have the first inequality. The
second inequality follows from A2 ≤ 0 and y > y + ²0 −ΨH . ¤
4 Concluding Remarks
In this note, we give sufficient conditions of cross risk vulnerability. These conditions
are a generealization of the well–known sufficient conditions of risk vulnerability:
standard risk aversion and decreasing and convex risk aversion. Since most deci-
sions under uncertainty are multi–dimensional, we need to understand the effects
of background risks in multi–dimensional decisions under uncertainty. A best way
to understand them generalize those of one–dimesional decisions under uncertainty.
This paper can be regarded as one of a series of studies. We have many future re-
serches to understand the effects of background risks in multi–dimensional optimal
choices under uncertainty, since we have a great number of understandings regarding
them in one–dimension.
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